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“Let’s pretend there’s a way of getting through into it, somehow, Kitty. Let’s 
pretend the glass has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why, it’s turning into a sort of mist now, I declare! It will be easy enough to get through –”
  
 
(Lewis Carroll, Through 
the Looking-Glass, 
1999 [1872] p. 4-5)  
What is Wonderland but a reflexive experience? Like a dream, it 
transports and guides you every step of the way toward the fullest 
experience of the ‘self’ away from the frameworks of reality, and until 
you cannot differentiate fantasy from reality. In the land of 
unimaginable experience designed by fairy tale, or in the heart of a 
museum exhibition, fantasy, as an artifice of the mind, is responsible 
for the creation of new worlds of imagined meaning within the well-
known reality. This significant breach between real and surreal is 
where the deepest social discoveries can be made.  
Museums are supposed to be imagined and not just created or 
developed. They work like a story being told and they need creativity 
as a starting point. Thus, their whole existence will depend on the 
convincing enunciation of the teller. In most social analyses of 
museums, researchers are misguided to direct their focus to the 
power of the “truth” disseminated by these institutions. What 
misguides them, in fact, is the very power of the museums’ 
convincing speech. Nevertheless, museums are powerful, not for the 
assumed ‘truth’ we may ‘read’ in their material objects or for the 
information they carry. Instead, their power lies in the performance 
that makes the audience believe in the act that is being played: what 
we may call the museum performance.   
The focus of this paper is the study of museums as social agents that 
produce performances. Distancing ourselves from a more 
informational and objective perspective – which may suggest a clear 
bond between museums and libraries, archives, or cultural centers 
for instance, and which approximates museology with information 
sciences – it would be preferable to think of museums in relation to 
theme parks, or carnivals, as in the North American institution.   
The anthropologist Anthony Seeger (1990, p. 13) suggests that 
theme parks are important in the sense that they alter perception. 
Theme parks, as much as many museums, alter the perception 
individuals have of themselves, of their own bodies and space. In a 
Ferris wheel, we are allowed to have different perspectives of space 
when we go up and down. In a Fool’s House, we are confronted with 
our own image in a distorted mirror. As in a traditional carnival, one is 
made to feel that the social rules do not apply there. The cultural 
performance establishes a permanent state of drama and play that 
allows the audience to relate to social order in a different, imaginative 
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level of the social reality. However, a particularity of theme parks 
must be stressed: while most amusement parks are, in fact, noisy, 
chaotic, and subversive, a theme park tends to be conceptualized as 
an organized performance that is offered to the audience as a playful 
breach from social order – deceiving chaos by presenting a different 
version of lived reality.   
Defined by Victor Turner (1988, p. 22) as “the eye by which culture 
sees itself and the drawing board on which creative actors sketch out 
what they believe to be more apt or interesting ‘designs for living’”, 
the cultural performance instates a reflexive perspective to the social 
order in which, like in many successful museums or musealized 
sites, the audience is allowed to confront its place in history and in 
society. In this sense, a performance is often a critique of the social 
life it grows out of or “an evaluation (with lively possibilities of 
rejection) of the way society handles history” (Turner, 1988, p. 22).  
By comparing museums with theme parks and highlighting the value 
of reflexive experience, the present analysis aims to deconstruct the 
notion of museums as informational institutions and to propose a new 
frame for museology’s subject of study. As a result, Museology, as a 
discipline oriented to the study of what is produced by museums or of what produces them (sometimes called ‘museality’ or 
‘musealization’), is progressively proving to be closer to a human or 
social science than to its traditional approximation to the information 
sciences, as some of the past theorists of these disciplines have 
insisted. 
 The specificity of Museology’s subject of study: 
overcoming the informational paradigm 
 
Museology has long been submitted to an epistemology of the 
information sciences. As a discipline that was originally conceived as 
a ‘science’ by authors from Eastern and Central Europe since the 
1960s, museology has been placed side by side with other applied 
disciplines such as archival studies and librarianship, being itself 
defined as an information science in the 1980s and 1990s: 
 
Information sciences include: information sciences in a 
narrow sense, documentation, communicology, theory of 
classification systems, general theory of systems, 
librarianship, bibliology, science of science, archivistics, 
MUSEOLOGY, lexicology, theory of artificial languages, 
theory of solving nonnumeric problems, cryptology, etc. 
(Maroević, 2004, p. 15)  
Some of the founding thinkers of theoretical museology from this part 
of the world – where an advanced theory for museology has been 
developed and disseminated – were responsible for placing the 
discipline among the “other” information sciences, mostly because 
they were trained and sometimes well-known researchers in that 
particular field of knowledge. According to them, these supposed 
‘sciences’ within the field of information would be defined by dealing 
with “systematic study of the process of emitting, collecting, 
selecting, evaluating, elaborating, archiving, retrieval, transmission, 
distribution, explaining, using and protection of information” 
(Obrazloženje, 1982 apud Maroević, 1983 [2004]). As much as these 
subjects may be considered social processes related to the field of 
communication and directly connected to museum practice, we may 
argue that such an objective definition fails to include some of the 
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most museological processes, which are: creating, recreating, 
imagining, enacting, and playing, among others. 
The central difference between museology and the information 
sciences – which we wish to stress in the present analysis – arises 
when one confronts the specific subjects of study. If one may 
consider the archive and the library (or their practical functions) 
respectively as the subjects of study of archival studies and 
librarianship, the same cannot be inferred about the museum in 
relation to museology.  
The main reason lies in the fact that these social sciences and their 
particular researchers are studying mere informational relations – 
leaving human experiences and performances outside of their scope. 
This is not the case for museology. In a way, we may infer that 
museology studies reflexive processes in the form of cultural 
performances, i.e. the focus in this contemporary discipline is taken 
away from fixed, stable objects as carriers of information to the 
subjective human experiences and the very act of creating new 
worlds in which information may be produced and transformed. 
Having the museum as a stage in which these reflexive encounters 
take place – a stage that can be instituted or improvised – museology 
cannot be perceived as a discipline that is irrefutably attached to an 
institution.  
From a different perspective, even the museum has been, to a great 
extent, distinguished from other informational institutions. For 
instance, libraries and archives treat information as the main object 
of the user’s discovery while, on the other hand, museums have the 
visitor (viewed as a social actor) as an object in itself. Information 
centers are supposed to be transparent; museums are allowed to 
‘play’ hide and seek with their objects, using lights, shadows, sounds, 
and theater to engage their visitors in a meaningful performance. Of 
course museums deal with information too, but in such a way that it 
is impossible for them to be defined by disciplines that study them 
solely through an informational approach. In other words, the subject 
of museology cannot be so objective if we intend it to be human.  
If museums were all about transmitting data (as elements of reality), 
in the purest information sense, they would be deprived of 
imagination and wonder – subjective states that happen beyond the 
object. In that case, the museum context would replicate the 
traditional communication model (sender-message-receiver), and we 
know it is, in fact, a much more complex process than that. 
Musealization turns real things into representations of the things 
taken from reality. The museum represents things as objects, giving 
them a distinct status and value. Hence, the object is not in any case 
‘raw reality’ but a complex representation. In other words, if we study 
performances, the stability of the museum (as a social category 
museologists are so attached to) vanishes in thin air. When taking 
into account the actors and its agencies, a researcher must consider 
that the object of a performative definition disappears when it is no 
longer performed, or, if it persists in the social order, then it means 
that other actors have taken over the relay (Latour, 2005, p. 37). That 
is how fugitive the empirical object really is.   
In the past, the founding mothers and fathers of our discipline have 
already approached such a perception that leads to the relativization 
of museology’s subject of study. Indeed, since 1965 in the former 
Czechoslovakia, Zbyněk Z. Stránský raised questions on the subject 
of study of museology, denying, for the first time, the museum as its 
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‘scientific’ subject matter (Stranský, 1965, pp. 30-33). The museum 
would be, according to Stránský, “only an instrument to perceive a 
certain way of cognition of society” (Stránský, 2005, p. 111 apud 
Baraçal, 2008, p. 70, italics added). He was responsible for the 
disconnection of the museology subject from the museum, as a 
historic institution, to museality – understood as a “specific aspect of 
reality”. This notion would lead Stránský to conceive the cognitive 
intention of museology as the ‘scientific’ interpretation of an “attitude 
of man to reality” (Stránský, 1980 apud van Mensch, 1992). This 
reflection was possibly the zero mark for the development of a 
systematic thinking on museology and its analytical subject, first in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and later in other parts of the globe.  
 
A “specific relation” or a reflexive experience? 
Anna Gregorová, a Czech author influenced by the gnosiological 
references introduced in museology by Stránský, defined, after him, 
the museological subject of study as “specific relations of man to 
reality” (Gregorová, 1980, p. 19). With this vague definition, 
Gregorová emphasized the fact that the subject in the relation 
realizes the totality of reality and at the same time differentiates itself 
from the object of observation. He/she differentiates the part from the whole, assuming a museum attitude towards the observed reality.    
The focus in many definitions presented in the first theoretical 
approaches to museology was on the cognitive notion of the 
“relations of man to reality” conceived by Stránský and Gregorová. 
This philosophical assertion reifies the separation of man from reality 
and presupposes the existence of a (material) reality that is divorced 
from society. According to a critical analysis, those are two 
sociological errors that should be adamantly avoided in a museology 
that should be more concerned with a wider range of associations 
among the different agents composing society.    
First, we may recall that the breach between subject and object is, in 
fact, fabricated by a particular appropriation of reality. It was first 
conceived as an important part of Descartes’ cogito, according to 
which subjects as ‘minds’ exist as completely separated entities from 
physical reality. This conception of a mind that is even detached from 
a physical body and exists beyond any materiality lies in the 
foundation of idealistic philosophy. It was further explored by Kant 
and discussed by Hegel. But it is only since the Enlightenment that 
Rationalism would translate it into politics, becoming a central part of 
dominant ideologies in the West. In the case of museums, this 
breach is a historic phenomenon that distinguishes Modernity and characterizes a certain a priori for the existence of this institution.  
Therefore, according to the Gregorovian assumption, museums are 
places where this separation is given between a subject that thinks 
and conceives the world as a mind and objective reality. As an 
institution that simply applies a specific relation of man to reality, 
museums are socially and philosophically outdated.  
Equally influenced by Stránský’s thinking, in 1981, the Brazilian 
museologist Waldisa Rússio defines the subject of museology as the 
museum fact, or the museological fact, understood as “the profound 
relationship between man, the cognizant subject, and the object” 
(Rússio, 1981, p. 42). This theorist separates, once again, the subject of reason – under the clear influence of the cogito – from the 
object of knowledge, “that part of reality to which man belongs, and 
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over which he has the power to act”, both parts considered in the 
museum fact.  
The very definition of the subject of study of museology as a relation 
between parts that differentiate themselves, creating an asymmetry, 
is an error in the sense that it ignores how asymmetries and 
differences are created socially. There is no such thing as a ‘relation’ 
if we conceive the social world as a network of associations that 
generate constant transformation. The contemporary anthropologist 
Bruno Latour states that it is precisely because it is so difficult to 
maintain asymmetries, to durably entrench power relations, or to 
enforce inequalities, that so much work is being devoted to shifting 
the weak and fast-decaying ties to other types of links (Latour, 2005, 
p. 66). ‘Relations’ are a deceiving kind of link that reifies the social 
reality. In addition, the ‘social’ in itself is here perceived as “a type of 
connections between things that are not themselves social” (Latour, 
2005, p. 5), or as a movement of re-association and reassembling 
(Latour, 2005, p. 7), according to Latour’s actor-network theory.    
What we propose in the present text is the dislocation of the 
epistemological problem of museology from the subject of study to 
the cognitive frames we use to interpret it. In other words, the museological problem is not having the museum as subject matter, 
but understanding the museum exclusively by a dated philosophical 
assumption (the Cartesian cogito), limiting all thinking processes. As 
we will sustain, the subject of museology should not be defined 
unidimensionally by the subject-object relation forged in the West, 
but instead should consider all kinds of possible associations among 
subjects, objects, relations, subjects behaving as objects, objects 
behaving as subjects, etc. These roles are performed by people and 
things in reality and are reified in the museum theory produced over 
the last fifty years. They are simply parts played by the most different 
types of elements, and they can be modified, inverted, transformed, or translated in different ways, forming what we call the museum 
performance.     
A performance theory for Museology 
Presenting the problem of museum and reality – reality as the 
museum object – Gregorová reaches an ontological problem at the 
core of museology, i.e. the explanation of reality in itself, as a carrier 
of a gnoseological value and potential (Gregorová, 1980, p. 19), or of 
a museum value also known as museality. By disconnecting the 
question from the museum in relation to the reality that ‘is produced’ 
by it, Gregorová points out to the fact that there is something 
between man and reality, something beyond the object and matter 
that is worth being studied. This thing, which is philosophically 
presented as a property of the museum object, is created by what 
can be called the museum performance.     
Cultural performances are always connected to ‘real’ events, but they 
are not simple expressions of culture or even of changing culture. Considering some cultural forms as not so much reflective as 
reflexive, Victor Turner points out that here the analogy is not with a 
mirror but rather with a reflexive verb (Turner, 1988, p. 24). In that 
sense, culture – like verbs – has at least two ‘moods’ – indicative and 
subjunctive – in most languages, and these moods are most 
hopelessly intermingled. As Turner explained, when society bends 
back on itself, it 
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meanders, inverts, perhaps lies to itself, and puts 
everything so to speak into the subjunctive mood as well 
as the reflexive voice. (Turner, 1988, p.25)  
By doing that, society works in a state of supposition, desire, and 
possibility, rather than stating actual facts. This arrangement of 
things dissolves what were once factual components of reality and 
instates a more playful spirit. A ‘reflex’, on the other hand, 
presupposes ‘realism’. But of course, even in the context of a 
museum or in art and literature, realism is only a matter of artifice 
and what is real is a result of cultural definition. For Turner, the 
genres of cultural performance are not simple mirrors, but rather 
“magical mirrors of social reality”, because they are capable of 
exaggerating, inverting, re-formatting, magnifying, minimizing, and 
even falsifying the known chronicled events (Turner, 1988, p. 42).   
What we aim for, with the separation of the museological subject of 
study from the strict man-reality relation to a broader, sociologically 
founded unit of analysis, is to demonstrate that a relation between 
philosophical entities – man-reality, subject-object – constitutes a 
type of performance, in fact. This way we distance ourselves from an 
empirical system of relations to reach a system of associations that 
study actors in their agencies instead of a Cartesian equation.   
In that sense, ‘man’ cannot be considered the only actor in a 
‘relation’. For the actor-network theory (ANT), defended by Bruno 
Latour, if we stick to the decision to consider the actors through their 
agencies, then anything that modifies a state of affairs by making a 
difference is supposed to be an actor (Latour, 2005, p. 71). Thus, 
there is no hierarchy established to differentiate subjects from 
objects. A thing is also studied as an actor in the subject-object 
equation – or, at least, an actant, if it has no figuration. Of course, 
this does not mean that these participants ‘determine' the action, that 
“hammers ‘impose' the hitting of the nail”. According to Latour: 
 
“In addition to ‘determining' and serving as a 'backdrop for 
human action', things might authorize, allow, afford, 
encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render 
possible, forbid, and so on.” (Latour, 2005, p.71)  
This also does not mean that objects do things ‘instead’ of human 
actors. Latour argues that no social science can exist without first 
exploring the question of who and what participates in the action. 
This primary empirical question could mean – as it certainly does for 
museology – letting in the so-called “non-humans” (Latour, 2005, 
p. 71). The human-reality relation, then – limiting of the subject of 
museology – could begin to be perceived as a relation between 
associations, and, in that sense, it could be fully studied by a human 
science.  
For a more realistic sociological perspective, we have to accept that 
the continuity of any course of action or relation will rarely consist of 
human-to-human or object-object connections, but will probably 
zigzag from one to the other (Latour, 2005, p. 75). The simplistic 
triangle between man, object, and institution that traveled through all 
museological theory so far is sociologically barren. The museum 
performance, in which the three roles of the ‘public’, the ‘object’, and 
the ‘museum’ are socially enacted, should no longer be perceived as 
a true social relation, in order to be systematically studied as a 
performance of the social – or of the museum. 
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Furthermore, this new perception implies that if the museum is a 
thing that performs the relation of man to reality, then musealization 
is the action towards which we should direct our interest – as social 
scientists or researchers of associations. Because associations 
prevail, we can conceive of, for instance, calculation without a 
calculator, acceleration without a car, or even education without a 
school. Musealization, then, exists beyond the museum. It is the 
subjective experience that makes the theme park, not the attractions 
by themselves. It is the subject reflected in the distorted mirror who is 
experiencing the distortion.   
Just as the hammer does not ‘impose’ the hitting of the nail, 
museums do not impose musealization. In fact, museums are the 
mediators and not the main actors of this process; they participate in 
the action, but they cannot configure, in any conceivable way, the 
sole subject of museology.  
Thus, the study of museum performances intends to reach realization 
of the fact that objects as well as subjects are made. 
Objects.Subjects.Reality. Social categories constructed in the 
museum performance instead of absolute truths constitutive of this 
institution. Masks that museums enact in a specific moment of our 
history. Museology, as a social science, cannot be limited to them in 
order to define its field of study. 
 The museum as theme park: museology, exploring 
reflexive experiences 
 
What is most telling about a theme park performance is how it 
responds to the audiences’ needs to escape reality and individual 
demand to experience the ‘self’ in a different state. In general, 
spectators are very aware of the moment when a performance takes 
off. When the performance begins, and you are inside the known 
limits of ‘fantasyland’, a presence manifests itself. Something has 
‘happened’. The performers have touched or moved the audience, 
and some kind of collaboration, a collective special theatrical life, is 
born. Through this collaborative force that is instated when the 
audience believes in the performance of the performer, the audience 
is transported to the new world created with the performer.  
In the performance, once the audience crosses the gates of the 
theme park or reaches a state of museality, the boundaries between 
staged reality and the social order disappear, as well as the 
constructed limits that separate the subject from the object. The 
ultimate goal of museum performance is liberating the audience from 
its regular ties to reality and transforming the subject in the object of 
its own reflection. Suppressing the separation predicted in the cogito, 
the performance creates a brand-new type of relation for the ‘self’ in 
the musealized stage.   
As in the theme park, museum visitors are taken to a level of reality 
where they are allowed to “play” with the many elements present, 
with the visitor acting him/herself as one of the elements being 
“played” in the reflexive experience. Play, which in English can relate 
to a game or dance, also has the sense of an “exercise of oneself” 
(Turner, 1982, p. 33). Play in ritual or theater manifests itself through 
work and by actors involved in a shared activity. In museums, when 
the audience becomes the actors, the performance of the selves 
involved in a shared experience results in the expression of true 
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identities – and in the notion that identities are also practical 
categories. At the same time, in a theatrical act or “social drama” 
(Turner, 1988), the individual is at once himself and another. The 
individual is divided between being and not-being, in a reflexive and 
subjective experience.   
As we have demonstrated, the breach between subject and object, 
human and non-human, society and heritage, etc., is indeed an 
artificial one, and museums cannot be considered to be reduced to 
this traditional relation of “man” to “reality”. That is because, as 
anthropology has confirmed in several studies, persons can be things 
and things can be persons in many different contexts, situations, and 
performances. The present paper is an invitation for museology 
researchers to think of museums, things, concepts, and experiences 
as if they were deeply bound to persons, subjects, and societies, 
because in fact they are. 
 Redirecting museology towards metamuseology: the 
configuration of a reflexive human science  
 
In 1983, at the ICOFOM annual symposium in London, John Hodge 
exclaimed:  
 
What we need is someone to outline a theory in finite 
terms which we all understand. Its philosophy, its 
statement of propositions used as principles of explanation 
for phenomena etc. needs to be clearly stated with 
concrete examples so that there is no misunderstanding of 
what is meant. Only then will we be able to have 
progressive discussion. (Hodge, 1983, p. 61)  
In the very moment when social sciences are questioning their 
fundamental principles and confronted with the ‘truth’ that there are 
no ‘truths’ in empirical studies, thinkers inside ICOFOM seemed to 
claim a single truth capable of providing an immediate systematic 
theory for museology.  
According to Joanna Overing (1985), who explores the recent crisis 
of faith in philosophy over the empiricist’s paradigm of rationality, 
within systematically analytical studies, the idea of a “single world” is 
being challenged. Turning to look at themselves and their own 
actions, social scientists reveal that the world – from the perspective 
of our knowledge of it – is how we view it through the paradigms we 
create. These researchers, differing from philosophers who are not 
usually asking social questions, are asking about “moral universes” – 
in Overing’s terms – their basic duty being to understand the 
intentions and objectives of actors within particular social worlds 
(Overing,1985, p. 2). Contrary to modern Western ‘science’ and the 
attendant proposition that truth is amoral and facts are autonomous 
from value, facts and truths can be analyzed as being tied to different 
sets of social, moral, and political values. Thus, all truths have their 
moral aspect; to hope to find universal and independent criteria for 
truth has proven to be an unreachable goal that suits only thinkers 
who are still defending their control over reality construction.  
The cognitive powers of Western thought in controlling and knowing 
the material world are at the base for museums, but they cannot be 
the foundation of contemporary museology. Gradually, what is being 
perceived with the possibility of a ‘science of the science’ is the fact 
that Rationality works as a limiting tool for the analytical viewpoint 
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over the Others and especially over him/herself. The Western 
fetishism for epistemological objects such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’, and 
‘knowledge’ – or even the ‘museum’ – is little by little demolishing the 
ways we relate to moralities and epistemologies different from our 
own.  
Throughout most of the 20th century, in the early years of the 
development of museology around the world, the thinkers of the 
‘museum’ were not separated from their supposed subject of study. 
Museum professionals were the ones conceiving ‘museology’. The 
separation between researchers and their subject of study – which is 
usually constructed by specific methods – has not been fully 
accomplished in museology, and maybe still isn’t to this day. Perhaps 
the reason we are still unable to define the subject of museology is 
that we are so close to museums we remain their faithful hostages.  
What differentiates, though, ‘museology’ from ‘museum theory’ or 
‘museum studies’ is the desire of the first to be acknowledged as the 
systematic approach in the context in which this term is being used. 
In order for that to happen, a methodological distance must be 
created between researchers and their subject of study. The theory 
of museology produced in the past forty years is neither a product of 
museum practice nor the mere expression of a few philosophers’ 
ideas disseminated from Eastern Europe. In fact, the theory is the 
result of a reflection developed by these thinkers confronted with 
certain museum practices in the different contexts in which they 
acted.  
Methodologically speaking, the agents who make museums, and 
their agencies, must be studied by the theoreticians and researchers 
of museology today. Nevertheless, when the same people play both 
roles – the empirical researcher who is also the museum 
professional – objective distance will depend on exercising reflexivity 
on his/her own museum practice. Here the museum will be clearly 
separated from the museological with the artifice of performance.  
The first works on museology, by ICOFOM theorists, were just theory 
and not systematically analytical studies because they consisted of 
mere reflections – lacking the reflexivity that is, in part, the 
acknowledgement of performance in the constructed truths. The 
study of museum performance today allows any analytical researcher 
to see him/herself as an actor on the stage of the museum 
representations. Such reflexivity in the making of social science may 
reveal itself to be a process that includes self-knowledge and the 
revision of paradigms.  
Over the years, the invention of unilateral relations or realities that 
can be “touched with a finger” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 228) has long 
been common for social scientists, who preferred to deal with these 
well-defined concepts instead of with the overall conception of the 
concepts. In museology, the invention of philosophical truthshas 
caused a series of misunderstandings among theorists. This 
confusion was due to the limited empirical reality behind the 
associations considered by those who made these assumptions.  
After the early 1980s and the first superficial attempts to summarize 
a theory for museology, some authors (Teather, 1983; van Mensch, 
1992) pointed to a more realistic solution for a methodical museology. Research was the answer. The truth of the matter is that 
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no philosophical ‘magic’ would create a social ‘science’ or its subject 
without a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical research.  
What substantially prevents the existence of a ‘science’ called 
‘museology’ remains the fact that its theoretical production and 
methods are marked by the Cartesian idea of the ‘museum’, 
designed – as a metaphor and literally – in the rationalist system of 
knowledge fabricated in Western Modernity. In this ‘museum’ that 
organized objects and ideas – or ideas as objects – ‘things’ were 
created to be put on the shelves of knowledge in order to be 
observed, organized, counted, weighed, and measured by the 
encyclopedic empiricist. Man was very much separated from things, 
and things were fully dominated as passive objects in the gnosiologic 
relationship.   
Museology, born in the interior of this kind of museums, and 
conceived by the professionals working in these institutions, has 
inherited their dogmas. For subjects that strongly desire to control 
their own part of reality – as with human sciences in general – the 
notion according to which human beings invent their own reality is 
debated with certain difficulty even today.   
The discussion of a specific method for museology raises two 
fundamental questions: first, “how does museology mold the 
practice?” and second, “how does the practice mold museology?” 
Certainly, museology cannot be the discipline that studies the limited 
and undefined universe of the museum. The very concept of the 
‘museum’ used to explain heterogeneous experiences, to which 
theorists refer as a “phenomenon” related to the terms “museology”, 
“museography”, “theory of museum”, “museistic” (Stránský, 1980, p. 
43), and so on …, is flagrantly an artifice of method, created to justify 
the existence of an empirical museology.  
Beyond this tautological conception, the practice available for actual 
research escapes any kind of ‘museum’ characterization. By 
considering the study of the mediations that formalize the wide 
process of musealization – which may be mistaken for the process of 
declaring heritage, when we accept the viewpoint of a “heritology” – 
we then have a concrete empirical field for museology.  
It is thus clear that an effective social science may conceive 
musealization as an agency and all the persons and objects involved 
in it as agents. To find the tracing of these associations would be the 
work of the museologist (who is not the museum professional but the 
social scientist). As the epistemologist who thinks about “the 
meaning of meaning”, or the psychologist who thinks about how 
people think, the museologist can be seen as the one who thinks 
about the museological “thinking” – and in this sense Stránský 
wouldn’t be wrong for suggesting the existence of “meta-theoretical 
problems” for this “science” (Stránský, 1980, p. 44). The clear path to 
a reflexive museology would be, in our perspective, understanding 
metamuseology as the consciousness of museology, working in a 
philosophical way to pose museological questions and to interrogate 
the different realities where ‘musealization’ (whatever it is called) is 
conceived.   
By focusing on the study of performances and associations, this area 
of study becomes less attached to the ‘museum’ as an absolute object and more concerned with the construction ofmuseums’ 
representations. The museum performance would work as a 
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measurement or standard representation to be studied in the 
different contexts in which it is evoked, from the Louvre to the favelas 
of Rio de Janeiro, which share a belief in this historically idealized 
categorization.  
If the study of museology is museology, thus the classical rationalist 
pretension of the museum’s absolute objectivity must be left aside, 
making space for a relative objectivity that considers the museum 
representation according to the agents’ agencies. Furthermore, it is 
mandatory to accept that the museum as a philosophical entity 
depends on the specific categories and institutions from the West, 
and that universalization of the concept is not realistic. From the 
gnosiological paradigm introduced by Stránský and Gregorová, we 
depart towards a reflexive paradigm that supposes the re-evaluation 
of the very constitution of paradigms.     
As other human sciences, museology must be reassembled as a 
subject of mediations in order to act on the transition between its own 
representations and the representations of the actors it studies.    
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thesis).University of Zagreb.   Abstract 
This paper discusses the definition of museology as a form of information 
science and analyzes the accepted definitions for museological study. It 
intends to point out some inconsistencies in the philosophical Stranskyan 
museology in order to reformulate the notion of its subject of study. This 
debate will require revision of a philosophical perspective through a 
sociological viewpoint in light of the actor-network theory proposed by Bruno 
Latour. Finally, the paper maintains that the man-reality relation forged in the 
West as a hegemonic museum performance should not define museology’s 
subject. Otherwise, it should consider all kinds of possible associations among the different roles that are played, evolving from a corpus of 
reflections on the museum to a reflexive museology that has musealization in 
the center of its studies. 
 Keywords: Museum, Museology, Information sciences,Reflexivity, 
Performance.   Resumen 
El artículo discute la definición de la museología como una ciencia de la 
información y analiza las definiciones conocidas del objeto de estudio 
museológico. El texto se propone a marcar algunas de las inconsistencias en la museología filosófica stranskiana en la búsqueda de reformular la 
noción del suyo objeto de estudio. Ese debate exigirá una revisión en esa 
abordaje filosófica por medio de un punto de vista sociológico teniendo en 
cuenta la teoría actor-rede propuesta por Bruno Latour. Finalmente, el 
artículo aboga que la relación hombre-realidad construida en el Occidente 
como una performance museal hegemónica non debe servir para definir el 
objeto de estudio de la museología. Por el contrario, la definición debe 
considerar todos los tipos de asociaciones entre los diferentes papeles 
interpretados, avanzando de un corpus de reflexiones sobre el museo para 
la museología reflexiva que tiene la musealisación en el centro de los suyos 
estudios.     
 Palabras clave: Museo, Museología, Ciencias de la 
información,Reflexividad, Performance.             
